Were you wondering which sector of the U.S. economy would be next to take a dive from the year-old credit crunch? Well look no further, because Barron's [subscription required] reports that private equity firms like Apollo Global Management, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and Blackstone Group (NYSE: BX) are hurting gators thanks to too much borrowed money and the weak financial performance of the companies they bought. And business is way down, Barron's reports that through mid-August, the 2008 total deal volume "stood at $67 billion, versus more than $400 billion in the corresponding 2007 period."
This does not come as a surprise to me. In February 2007, I appeared on CNBC arguing that private equity had peaked. And I began to question its long-term viability back in August 2006 when Barron's Alan Abelson quoted my thoughts on the matter. The basic problem is that when debt is cheap, private equity booms and when it starts selling itself to the public, investors should hold onto their wallets for dear life. People who own private equity firms tap their superior knowledge of the coming downturn to convince the public to bail them out by buying their stock.
Barron's cites -- as evidence of trouble in private equity land -- examples of the declining value of the publicly traded debt in companies that private equity took private at too-high prices with too much borrowed money. It writes that bonds of "many companies taken private in the past two years have plunged to 50 cents on the dollar or less, signaling that investors fear they won't be fully repaid. Many companies that were the subjects of buyouts a year or two ago are so grossly over-leveraged that they're struggling simply to pay interest. If they were to default, debt investors would be stung, but equity investors would be even worse off; the value of their holdings would be deeply impaired or wiped out."
Barron's notes that Apollo is in the most trouble thanks to the poor performance of many of the companies it bought. Among these is bankrupt Linens 'n Things which is "imperiling the $650 million invested by Apollo and others in its 2006 LBO." But this has not stopped institutional clients from committing to a new "$14 billion LBO fund."
Barron's also points out that the publicly-traded buyout funds may be putting unrealistically high valuations on their holdings. It notes that "Blackstone, for instance, values its $25 billion of private-equity investments and $19 billion of real-estate deals each quarter, way before the investments are monetized. The exercise amounts to a self-graded exam about which Blackstone discloses little."
Barron's continues, "Want to know how highly Blackstone now values its original $5 billion stake in Hilton or its $3 billion interest in Freescale? The information isn't publicly available. Blackstone says that investors in its private-equity funds are entitled to it, but that its public shareholders aren't."
Given the difficulty of valuing these privately-held assets and the cost to general partners of lowering their stated value, these valuation issues don't surprise me. I pointed them out in a CNBC interview I did when Blackstone went public in June 2007.
There is one thing about all this that surprises me -- how long it has taken for these initial signs of trouble in private equity paradise to appear. In the late 1980s, the collapse of private equity put it into dormancy for at least a decade. This time around it could be even worse.
Peter Cohan is President of Peter S. Cohan & Associates. He also teaches management at Babson College and edits The Cohan Letter











Reader Comments (Page 1 of 1)
8-30-2008 @ 11:44PM
JD said...
Cohan, you're the only blogger worth reading on AOL Money. I agree completely. However, I think TPG, Blackstone and KKR are hurting as much or more than Apollo.
"Investors" in Blackstone have only themselves to fault for stupidity. Schwarzmann et al. pulled the wool over their eyes and made like bandits.