As a common shareholder, I am glad Geithner prevailed on the last item but there is not much I like about the entire plan. And I am a bit disappointed because I was hoping that the new administration would try some new ideas. I am wondering whether mediocrity prevailed in the face of pressure to do something fast. Did Obama back his Treasury Secretary in his first internal battle so he would start off on a credible foot? And what political damage will Obama suffer when it comes to light that Axelrod was right as the public gets wind of the big bonuses that TARP II recipients pay themselves?

Here's a brief description of the four-point plan and my thoughts on each (some of which I posted earlier):

• Lend Fed money to Wall Street so it can purchase toxic assets from banks. Bad: This plan appears to involve lending between $250 billion and $500 billion Fed money so that Wall Street can trade the toxic assets it created. But it begs the question of what price traders will pay for them: Pay more than the bank book value of the toxic assets and the Fed may not get its loan repaid; pay less and the bank takes a write off -- requiring it to raise capital. A better approach would be my colleague's plan for the FDIC to buy the 15% of bad mortgages inside the toxic waste which would put a real value on the MBSs and free banks to lend
• Use Fed cash to buy loan-backed securities. Neutral: This plan would add between $500 billion to $1 trillion, to an existing $200 billion Fed program -- via last fall's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) -- to buy commercial, student, auto and credit card loan-backed securities. I am not sure whether this is a good idea because I don't know whether the first $200 billion has had a positive effect on lending -- with the markets down hugely -- bond issuance fell 93% in asset-backed markets, 73% in corporate debt markets and 47% in mortgage-related areas since Q1 2007 -- it appears not to have worked. And the plan has a similar problem to the one described above regarding the price at which to buy the loans -- too high a price and taxpayers lose; too low and the banks take a hit.
• Invest more in banks. Neutral: This plan involves a "stress test" to decide which banks get more capital and which don't. This plan could be good if it means that only healthy banks get capital. But the stress test could take a very long time to administer which would delay the boost to healthy institutions while leaving open the question of what to do about the sick ones. Previous capital injections have lost taxpayers money in the form of underwater stock and warrants. We should not put any more money into zombie banks which do not lend it out. If the objective of the Treasury plan is to get credit flowing, it would be better to use money to create new banks.
• Help homeowners at risk of foreclosure. Neutral: This idea would make $50 billion available to enable people facing foreclosure to renegotiate the terms of their mortgages. This plan at least has the benefit of getting to the root of the problem -- which is that mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other securities are pools of mortgages many of which are in default. But plans to help those with their mortgages over the last several months have floundered so it's not clear what is different about this plan. To be fair, it should be judged on its details which will be announced next week.

I think this version of the plan may be a victory for Geithner, which appears to follow in his predecessor's footsteps of helping Wall Street while leaving the public at arm's length. I wish it was more obvious how this plan would boost lending and clean up toxic waste. I firmly believe that the ideas I suggested would do a better job of achieving these goals.

Peter Cohan is president of Peter S. Cohan & Associates. He also teaches management at Babson College. His eighth book is You Can't Order Change: Lessons from Jim McNerney's Turnaround at Boeing.