In a year of financial chaos, how can one even narrow the choice of most shocking financial collapse to just five candidates? Financial collapses took down venerable Wall Street firms and government enterprises. Even an entire country fell on the weight of this worldwide financial storm. There were so many financial casualties that the task to narrow this down to just five was difficult. We have chosen these five and placed them in alphabetical order.
Bear Stearns Bear Stearns held a respected place on Wall Street dating back to before the Great Depression, but in March 2008, this once-respected Wall Street firm was bought by JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM) for just $2 per share (or about $236 million). The stock price had been $36.75 on March 14, 2008 -- just two days before the JPMorgan deal was struck. Bear Stearns had been the most aggressive player in packaging and selling mortgage-backed securities, and their hedge funds were heavily loaded with the junk they sold. Many saw the fall of Bear Stearns as justice because it was the only major Wall Street bank that did not work with the Fed and participate in the $3 billion bailout of Long Term Capital Management in 1998. Payback is a bitch.
Beige book weakness, nationwide. Holiday retail sales tepid at best (so far). Business investment lackluster. And Friday yet another employment situation report from the good statisticians at the U.S. Department of Labor. Consensus: the U.S. economy probably shed another 300,000 jobs in November.
A decade of descent
One can't say we weren't warned about the recession that we're now in - - not with the increased concentration of wealth and concomitant increase in poverty, lack of job creation, and wage stagnation that accompanied the recent economic expansion, to go along with excessive leverage, system-wide.
New York Times (NYSE: NYT) columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman provides a little perspective on how we got here and also offers some hope, regarding these trying economic times.
On the signals, or signs, some in economics, corporate, and public policy circles are suggesting that we didn't have any signs of economic trouble ahead. "Why weren't we warned?"
Ah, but you were warned, Krugman said. And these warnings were ignored. Item: Clear signs of a housing bubble, after the dot-com bubble a decade earlier. Item: The implosion, and required dissolving of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 - - just one hedge fund, but one that nevertheless temporarily paralyzed credit markets, globally. Item: The near-universal belief in the market's ability to self-correct, self-police, and if need be, self-punish transgressors, when there was little case precedent to hold that mistaken notion. In sum, there were plenty of warnings, Krugman argues.
TheStreet.com's Jim Cramer says removing her from the FDIC would be a colossal mistake.
Don't kick out Sheila Bair! She knows the numbers. This morning, Bloomberg's reporting that Tim Geithner doesn't want Bair at the FDIC anymore because she is not a team player.
To which I say, "Thank heavens!" -- the team was terrible! These reports make her sound like Terrell Owens in the locker room -- a great player who is cancerous when going gets tough -- when it is actually the opposite: She is the franchise player to build around. When Indymac was seized (something I wish she had done earlier, but she waited as long as she could), she and her organization became the laboratory, the great central testing zone for what will work and what won't work to stem foreclosures, the root cause of all of our financial problems.
She was ignored, systematically ignored, even though she had the knowledge base. Both Geithner's organization and Treasury always thought the situation was either under control or could be controlled by top-down thinking: Give Wells (NYSE: WFC) (Cramer's Take) and Citi (NYSE: C) (Cramer's Take) and JPMorgan (NYSE: JPM) (Cramer's Take) and Bank of America (NYSE: BAC) (Cramer's Take) some money, they will lend, it will trickle down.
In another sign that the credit crunch has not disappeared, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey received no bids from investment banks to underwrite a taxable note offering.
The Port Authority was trying to sell $300 million worth of three-year notes, backed by revenue streams, Bloomberg News reported. The Port Authority operates airports, river crossings, and certain transit systems in the New York metropolitan area and has a strong credit rating. The agency is also rebuilding the World Trade Center site, including the new Freedom Tower.
Economist David H. Wang was apoplectic about the failed offering. "This is unbelievable," Wang said. "It's a ridiculous situation, frankly, and something has to be done to free-up these credit markets. This is the financial equivalent of Warren Buffett not being able to get a $20 million loan."
State, cities, and other taxing districts have had trouble selling bonds through advertised bidding, after institutional investors pared-back their appetite for fixed-income securities -- and just about every other asset class -- as the financial crisis intensified in September. In tandem, investment banks have balked at bidding for certain debt, sensing insufficient client demand, Wang said.
The recession, which officially began a year ago, is accelerating the pace of job loss. Since I began to notice the collapse of subprime back in the fall of 2006, watching the economy implode has been like a huge highway pileup in slow motion. And that crash is starting to create big economic injuries in the job market.
How so? Firing announcements rose 148% in November 2008 to 181,671 -- the most since January 2002 -- from 73,140 in November 2007. So far in 2008, the number of cuts has spiked 46% to 1,057,645, surpassing 1 million for the first time since 2005. And many of these cuts have come from financial services (91,356), computer and electronics (15,350), and retailing (11,073).
Having lived through two credit contractions, I could see this coming from miles away. But it happened far more slowly than I thought it would. And I did not foresee how the bad mortgages would cause a global financial crisis. But they have and here's how: $1.3 trillion in subprime mortgages were added to packages of complex securities, including $13 trillion of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
What's one reason for not jumping back in the market at this juncture?
Well, one could certainly cite end-of-the-year tax loss selling, which typically weighs on the market. Or the battle for Dow 8,000 between institutional bulls and bears. Or the fact that the Dow's path of least resistance, from a technical standpoint, remains down. (That's a major reason why the Dow drops so quickly: all that's required is a hedge fund manager to sneeze and the Dow drops 300 points, or so it seems.)
All of the above are valid reasons to remain on the sidelines.
Is Washington planning big changes?
But perhaps the best reason to not deploy new capital is the new era itself. The United States is preparing for a new presidential administration and one gets the sense that there could be a series of seismic shifts up ahead -- shifts that will affect money, markets, investing, and business trends.
It's true that after the U.S. government's allocation, via loans, loan guarantees, or investments, of about $8.2 trillion for the financial system, it's hard to picture shifts up ahead that could be as landscape-altering as those undertaken in the past year. But that could very well be the case nevertheless.
Those hoping for small change are likely to be disappointed. On January 20, President-elect Obama becomes President Obama and he is big change. U.S. Senator and now Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton, D-New York, was small change, and we saw how the electorate responded to her candidacy. Voters were so adamant for economic change (and other changes) after the United States' decade of descent that they not only blamed the Republican Party, they rejected anyone with even a hint of being a part of the economic policy mistakes, including Clinton.
Harvard reports that the value of its endowment has declined $8 billion between the end of June 2008 through October 2008. That would make Harvard's endowment worth 22% less than at the end of June, or $26.9 billion -- but it probably has further to fall thanks to illiquid assets like private equity interests. Meanwhile, Harvard and its peers could be in trouble because fewer people will be able to afford college given the market crash. That will mean college administrators are facing some tough choices.
Harvard is responding to the decline in its endowment by taking a "hard look" at staffing levels and compensation. It is forecasting a 30% drop for its endowment ending in June 2009, which would bring it to $25.8 billion, down another $1 billion. While this strikes me as optimistic, it does suggest the extent of the damage and the challenges Harvard and its peers face.
The options for universities are dwindling. A study suggests that tuition has risen 439% since 1982 while median family incomes have increased only 137% during that period. If tuition continues to rise at that rate, few families will be able to afford college. With the student loan market in dire straits and incomes likely to fall further due to layoffs, the only way for colleges to attract top students who can't pay will be to cut tuition even more on the lower income families while making up the difference by raising tuition for the wealthiest ones.
Auditors from the General Accounting Office say that no one is keeping particularly good tabs on how Paulson is using the $700 billion bailout fund. According toThe New York Times, "Government auditors urged the Treasury Department on Tuesday to act more quickly to develop the internal controls and hire the professional staff necessary to ensure that its $700 billion financial rescue package is operating effectively and ethically."
That won't happen. Treasury is too busy putting out fires, which range from getting money into the large banks to considering whether to fund a rescue plan for mortgage owners. Paulson has less than two months to leave his mark on the economy and then he is "retired." Treasury barely has enough qualified people to figure out where money should go, let alone keep careful track of it.
The complaint by auditors is fair, but it gets to the heart of most large federal government spending packages, whether they are for the Defense Department or new national health initiatives. These programs are just too large to monitor completely, so the taxpayers have to rely on the competence of the officials who spend the money in the first place.
Paulson is faced with using his personnel on saving the financial system or counting beans. He has, appropriately, put his effort into the more pressing problem.
Douglas A. McIntyre is an editor at 247wallst.com.
Shares of the New York-based company are down more than 78% this year. Keep in mind that Bank of America Corp. (NYSE: BAC) agreed to buy the once-venerable firm for $50 billion, a deal which is still making its way through the regulatory process. Did I mention that Merrill and Bank of America got a combined $25 billion from the Treasury Department and that Merrill may lose $13.3 billion this year, based on the average estimate of nine analysts surveyed by Bloomberg? That's more than double from a year earlier.
What in that sorry performance merits a reward of any sort? Wall Street needs to ween itself from the notion that everyone deserves a bonus, regardless of the macroeconomic environment. Top executives at Goldman SachsGroup Inc. (NYSE: GS) and UBS AG (NYSE: UBS) are refusing bonuses. Heck, so are the heads of the tone-deaf auto industry.
Merrill has already been very generous with its employees. Chief Executive John Thain got a $15 million sign-on bonus when he joined the company with the expectations that he would fix the mess created by Stan O'Neal. Given the turn of events, maybe he should give some of that money back. In 2007, the company paid out $15.9 billion, about $248,000 per employee.
If executives from General Motors Corp. (NYSE: GM), Ford (NYSE: F) and Chrysler can make it from Detroit to Washington in their hybrid vehicles by tomorrow, they'll plead for $34 billion -- up $9 billion from two weeks ago. You should not give them what they want. Instead, I recommend you let GM and Chrysler merge -- if you can convince Nissan CEO, Carlos Ghosn, to run the combined company. Ford will be fine on its own -- you should grant it the line of credit it requests.
A few weeks ago, I proposed a six step restructuring plan that would save $16 billion and help a combined GM and Chrysler to survive. To put that plan into effect, there is no question that the managers of GM and Chrysler must be replaced by an auto executive with a track record for turning around an ailing competitor. That's what Ghosn did when he took over Nissan after it merged with Renault in 1999, where he was a VP. Ghosn won many small victories against an entrenched Nissan bureaucracy to revive the Japanese automaker. Ghosn is just what GM/Chrysler needs.
Make no mistake, this is not an industry to which it makes economic sense to lend money. Bankers need to get repaid from the cash flow that a business generates either from operations or by selling assets. With sales plunging -- GM's fell 41.3%, Ford's tumbled 30.5%, and Chrysler's crashed 47.1% -- there is no operating profit likely here. And demand for purchasing their assets -- such as GM's Saab or Ford's Volvo -- appears to be weak.
History is repeating itself, at least in the oil market.
Once again, a miscalculation by OPEC -- probably motivated by greed or rational self interest carried to its logical (but foolish) extension -- has resulted in almost the same set of market conditions that resulted when OPEC made the same mistake in 1990-1991.
Then, following the Persian Gulf War in 1990, OPEC increased production only grudgingly, in an attempt to hang onto sky-high oil prices of about $55-60 per barrel. (Or about $120 in today's dollars.) The result? A U.S. recession and a consequent collapse in oil demand, and in oil's price: oil first fell below $40, then $30 on its way to trading below $13 per barrel in 1998. Thirteen dollars a barrel in nineteen ninety-eight.
Those who fail to learn from history...
Fast forward to 2007. OPEC has an opportunity to at least slow, if not reverse the steady rise in oil prices, which were then testing $90. However, despite the fact that oil shocks have preceded every U.S. recession since 1972, except the post-September 11, 2001 recession, OPEC does nothing.
In fact, as the price of oil continued to spiral to dizzier and dizzier heights, OPEC meetings served as information dissemination opportunities to blame the rising price on anything but a lack of increased OPEC production: the weak dollar, geopolitical concerns, investors who view oil as a performing asset, and so on. In fact, what OPEC was doing during this phase of the oil cycle was, yet again, testing the limits of the market: i.e., to determine the maximum price the market could bear, in order to maximize revenue for oil-producing nations. Or, in other words, OPEC members were repeating the mistakes of 1990-1991.
A journalism professor of yours truly, Jon Sandberg, who also served in key positions for several Connecticut governors, had an interesting technique that he frequently deployed in seminars. A student would pose a question and Sandberg would say, "That's a good question. Is it acceptable and ethical to publish information that you know would show ethical and other lapses by the current president, if you know that information would also harm innocent individuals? That's a good question."
Then Sandberg would grab his cup of coffee and walk to the window side of the classroom, and stare out the window, sipping his coffee, saying nothing, for an eternity. Eventually, a student or two would begin the discussion.
What's a good question for today? Maybe this: where have all the consumers gone in the U.S. economy? BloggingStocks had a chance to grill economist Peter Dawson on the matter, and he has a few theories.
The first concerns structural and technological factors, he said. The U.S. is in the midst of adjusting to globalization, which, as most investors know, has resulted in the transfer of millions of good-paying U.S. jobs overseas to lower-cost centers. "The U.S. has also gained some jobs from globalization, but the net is still a major loss of good-paying jobs in the United States," Dawson said. "Some economists argue that's at the root of declining consumption. We are net-negative in the good-paying jobs category, so far, in globalization, and there simply aren't enough citizens with incomes adequate to buy the products."
The Baltic country of Latvia is struggling through the recession along with the rest of the world, but its leaders have taken an unusual approach to the situation. According to the Wall Street Journal, Latvia's Security Police recently detained economics lecturer Dmitrijs Smirnovs for two days for expressing pessimism about the current crisis.
Apparently, this was not the first foray by the Latvian police into the public discussion about economic prospects. Officials have been studying newspaper reports, chat room conversations, even text messages, for Negative Nellies violating the country's laws against spreading false or scurrilous info about the economy.
If such a law were passed in the U.S., whose head would go on the chopping block first? Certainly the Wall Street Journal is a wellspring of negativity. Fox and MSNBC are chronically aggrieved. I wouldn't want to be George Will or Rush Slimebaugh Limbaugh when the brownshirts start rounding up naysayers.
As a BloggingStocks writer, I might have to go underground myself. Just in case, I want to assure you that the economy is doing just fine; great, actually. Go buy oodles of stocks, Comrade.
A good rule for a forward-thinking executive to observe is never go anywhere -- at least don't walk into any meeting -- without the latest projections or models for the U.S. economy for the year ahead.
How's the U.S. economy likely to perform in the year ahead? Well, here are the summaries of economist David H. Wang's models based on predetermined values for 20 proprietary variables.
Realignment: This forecast assumes a modest $200-400 billion fiscal stimulus, a $70-80 a barrel oil price, record / near-record home mortgage foreclosures, along with efforts to realign U.S. energy policy, and reductions in health care spending accompanying national health care legislation. In this model unemployment rises to 9.5% and the recovery does not begin until Q4 2010. (That's correct: Q4 2010.)
Elongated: This model assumes a modest $200-400 billion fiscal stimulus and a $60 a barrel average oil price, with another year of record / near-record home mortgage foreclosures. Unemployment rises to 9.0%, and the economic recovery does not begin until late Q2 / early Q3 2010.
Steady-state: This model assumes about $500 billion in fiscal stimulus and a $60 a barrel average oil price, among other factors, that limits the recession's depth slightly. Unemployment still rises to 8.0% from the current 6.5%, but the economic recovery begins in early 2010.
Have central banks reached the limit of what they can do to fix the global economic crisis? The answer is yes, if you believe that the price of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) is any indication. With CDS premiums for corporate bonds reaching a new high, investors in the thinly traded, unregulated and poorly-disclosed corner of our financial markets are signaling that central banks cannot fix what ails the global financial markets. That scares me.
How are these CDS premiums measured? By a couple of complex CDS indices in the U.S. and Europe. For example, there's the Markit iTraxx Crossover Index of 50 high-risk, high-yield credit ratings corporate bond issuers whose premium climbed 18 basis points (100 basis points is 1%) to 956 this morning. in London. And there's the Markit iTraxx Europe index of 125 investment-grade corporate bond issuers which climbed 3.5 basis points to 191.5 having earlier traded at a record 198. Similar indices in Australia and Japan are at record levels as well.
Central banks around the world have cut their short-term lending rates to near zero and yet things keep deteriorating. As I posted, the next step for central banks could be trying to lower the rates of longer-dated, e.g., two year, government securities. But none of these efforts will work because banks are so afraid to lend since it is so hard to find businesses and individuals who are safe bets to pay back the money. So absent global infrastructure programs by governments around the world, this crisis could continue to explode.