If you've become comfortable with the current state of the housing market ... don't. Economists at Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) and Bank of America's Merrill Lynch (NYSE: BAC) say there's still plenty of risk in the housing market.

Alec Phillips, the head of Goldman's Washington office, said, "The risk of renewed home price declines remains significant." His "working assumption" is a drop of between 5% and 10% by the middle of next year.

While Washington wrangles over $820 billion to stimulate the economy, the Fed and the Treasury have already invested or guaranteed $9 trillion to keep the financial system from imploding. For some strange reason, this much bigger figure seems to fly out the door with no public debate; little clear idea of how it's being spent; or what benefit it's creating. Now the Treasury is poised to announce its own plan to rescue the financial system. I think that plan needs work.

However, the Treasury plan will not be announced as originally scheduled on Monday because there seems to be a concern that it would complicate the passage of the stimulus plan. Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs Group (NYSE: GS) has estimated that it would cost $4 trillion to absorb all the banks' troubled mortgage and consumer debt.

Will Treasury propose a plan to use government funds to do this absorbing? If so, it would mark the biggest example in American history of letting private interests reap profits from their bad decisions -- in the form of keeping their bonuses which total about $100 billion over the last several years -- while sticking the public with the resulting losses which so far exceed $1 trillion.

Banking analyst Meredith Whitney is credited with questioning assets on bank balance sheets given the collapse in the real estate market.

Taking advantage of a complete lack of information, Ms. Whitney triggered a massive collapse of trust in an industry by claiming that mortgage-backed securities were worth far less than what the market had perceived.

While she may have had a basis for her claims, her assessment was more sensational than factual. Mortgage-backed securities are quite complex instruments whereby loans are sliced, diced and packaged for sale to a global market.

With maturities extending 30 years into the future, it is unreasonable and unfair to assume that paybacks, even with high default rates will amount to what is currently priced into the market.

The lack of understanding of the underlying security or loans at the individual level has created uncertainty that has yet to be resolved.

For fans of the original "Star Wars" movie, think of the weakness in terms of attacking the Death Star. That one hole was exploited (we can debate the merits of doing so later) by Ms. Whitney and those like her.

In the accounting business, helping clients improve earnings is not that hard, if you can change the rules. Banks would like the boring green eye-shades to alter how they value assets on bank balance sheets, a pretty nifty way to cut losses without doing anything meaningful to balance sheets.

According to Reuters, "Fair value accounting, which requires assets to be valued at market prices, has been blamed for billions of dollars in write-downs by some U.S. banks and policymakers."

Yes, but wouldn't all their investors like to see how badly banks were managed? How big the gambles were on toilet paper assets like mortgage-backed securities?

While it is fine to sweep the dirt under the rug, the rules are the rules and have been the rules for some time. Changing them now would cause a dislocation in reporting, For 2008, losses may be accounted for under one set of criteria. Next year, that may change. How do shareholders see the actual difference in earnings from one year to the next if the way that assets are valued is changed?

It is always nice to re-write the rule book. Why shouldn't a basketball player who is active now be able to score 100,000 points because he gets credit for a point every time he blows his nose? Just a year or so ago, he actually had to put the ball into the hoop.

Douglas A. McIntyre is an editor at 247wallst.com.

The Treasury has decided that just bailing out American International Group (NYSE: AIG) to the tune of $122.8 billion and counting is not going far enough. Now it's time to use our money to bail out more insurance companies. As it turns out, the insurers that are likely to get the money are the same ones that took a blood bath earlier this month. The companies seeking a bailout include Met Life (NYSE: MET), Hartford Financial Services (NYSE: HIG), and Prudential Financial (NYSE: PRU).

You may be wondering, what crime did I commit that makes it socially acceptable for my money to be used to bailout the insurance industry? Aren't my home, auto, and life insurance premiums up to date? If so, what gives the insurance industry the right to use my taxes to pay for their investment mistakes? Because that is exactly what the insurance companies are doing.

How so? Their books are loaded down with asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that vastly exceed their shareholder's equity. These securities are not worth much -- in fact, a recent report suggested that CDOs were worth 10 cents on the dollar at best. If the insurers have these stated on their books at 60 cents on the dollar, the mark to market process could wipe out a significant portion of their capital.

During last night's presidential debate (which he lost badly) Republican John McCain vowed that if elected he would order the U.S. Treasury Department to purchase "bad mortgages" to help people avoid foreclosure. It's an idea that deserves consideration.

According to Bloomberg News, the McCain campaign estimates that it would cost $300 billion, some of which would be diverted from the $700 billion rescue of Wall Street. The Arizona senator did not provide specifics during the debate. Democrat Barack Obama proposed a similar idea during a press conference last month, according to Bloomberg. These proposals raise many questions.

First of all, can the government afford to purchase both mortgages and mortgage-backed securities? How will the government determine who gets help? Many people bought homes they could not afford because of criminally lax lending standards at some banks. Others were hoodwinked by unscrupulous mortgage brokers into taking adjustable-rate mortgages when they qualified for cheaper fixed-rate 30-year loans. These individuals are the most deserving of the government's help. Officials should try and help other distressed mortgagers provided that they can afford their properties. Otherwise, they should be given assistance to find affordable housing.

The $810 billion bailout plan was just approved by the House of Representatives after a second vote by a margin of 263-171. That's a lot of taxpayer money for a plan that misses the target. And with stocks falling well off the highest levels of the day, I gather that investors are not too surprised that it passed.

To put this in perspective, the Dow now trades 631 points below where it was on the morning of the record 778 point decline on Monday. That's when the House voted thumbs down on the original plan. I guess taxpayers will need to spend a few trillion dollars to get more of those triple digit gains.

Meanwhile, I think that unless the Treasury can solve the thorny problem of setting a price for the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), then it will fail to solve the real economic problem -- which is a lack of trust in the financial system. I've proposed what I thought would be a better solution.

Maybe we can try that one next week if stocks drop another 700 points. There seems to be no limit to the amount of taxpayer money the government is willing to throw at this financial crisis.

Peter Cohan is President of Peter S. Cohan & Associates. He also teaches management at Babson College and edits The Cohan Letter.

It seems that there is a problem with our financial system. That could be why Bear Stearns collapsed, the government took over Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM), Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE) and American International Group (NYSE: AIG). This problem could also explain why Merrill Lynch sold out to Bank of America (NYSE: BAC), why Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and why JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM) bought Washington Mutual (NYSE: WM). Problems with our financial system could also explain why the Commercial Paper market is freezing up -- making it harder for companies to come up with the short-term cash to pay employees and buy inventory.

But how did our system get to this point? There are five key principles of our current financial architecture that brought us here:

• Securitization. Up until about 30 years ago, people took out mortgages from an S&L and paid their loan officer every month until they owned their house. In the 1980s, Wall Street invented securitization -- the process of buying up, say, 1,000 mortgages from mortgage companies, creating a security based on those mortgages, paying for a AAA rating, and selling the securities to investors worldwide. Securitization is a problem for reasons I'll describe below.
• Too much borrowing. Over the last several years, Financial Institutions (FI) have made some $2 trillion in fees from securitization, according to DealBreaker. One reason for this is that they have been able to buy these securities -- of which there are $13 trillion on the market between Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) -- with a sliver of capital, roughly $340 billion. The typical FI had a ratio of assets to capital of 30:1. This meant that a mere 3% decline in the value of these securities would wipe out all the capital.

Bloomberg News reports that the price tag for the bailout being discussed this weekend in Washington just went up another $200 billion. That's if you believed the initial $500 billion estimate bandied about yesterday. According to Bloomberg, the plan will be broken into "$50 billion tranches which would last for at least two years" and would "accept mortgage-backed securities [MBS] and collateralized debt obligations [CDOs]." Since there are $13 trillion such securities out there -- I am not sure whether $700 billion will be enough to buy them all up -- unless this agency buys them at a steep discount.

That $700 billion price tag will increase the national debt ceiling to $11.3 trillion, that's more than double where it was in 2000 and it represents 80% of U.S. GDP. Why is that important? Because in international banking circles any country whose debt exceeds 60% of GDP is considered at risk of not being able to pay back its debt. So the U.S. is surely turning itself into one of the riskiest borrowers in the world. Thus it's too bad that the rest of the world seems to be entirely dependent on what happens here for the global economy work.

And it wouldn't shock me to wake up Monday morning that that $700 billion having hit $1 trillion or more. As the saying goes, when you owe a bank $100,000 and can't pay it back, that's your problem. But when you owe that bank $5 billion and can't repay, it's the bank's problem. That's the way the rest of the world must feel as the U.S. goes out to the beg the world to buy another trillion dollars worth of our national debt.

As my colleague Doug McIntyre posted this morning, the New York Times reports that Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (NYSE: LEH) plans to cut 1,500 jobs -- that's 6% of its workforce and Lehman has already terminated 6,000 staffers since June 2007. While Lehman has been a big player in mortgage origination and securitization, there is also the potential for cuts in other lines -- such as investment banking and trading, according to the Times. Since the credit crunch is so enormous in scale and scope, there may simply not be enough demand for Lehman to survive in its current form.

Lehman is expected to have a rough quarter. The Times reports that it could take a "$4 billion loss for the quarter of $3.30 a share." Much of the loss is due to its mortgage- and asset-backed securities -- of which it owns "about $61 billion." And since there is no market for them, Lehman must write down their value and take a charge against earnings and capital. Meanwhile after dropping 71% in the last year, Lehman's stock market value is roughly a sixth of the size of that portfolio of dodgy securities.

Lehman has evidently leaked several options for raising capital -- to add to the $6 billion it got earlier this year. The Times reports that these include "the sale of Lehman's investment management division, which includes Neuberger Berman and could fetch $7 billion to $10 billion. Other options include the sale of about $40 billion of troubled commercial real estate, and the creation of a separate unit that would be owned by Lehman shareholders and house a substantial portion of Lehman's commercial and residential mortgage assets, freeing the investment bank to try to move forward."

June 30 was the day when Thornburg Mortgage Inc. (NYSE: TMA) had hoped to complete at least 90% of its preferred stock repurchase as part of a last ditch effort to save the company from bankruptcy and return it to viability. CEO Larry Goldstone continues to state that bankruptcy is not an option.

Well, when the stock has lost 99% of its value, the company posted a $3 billion quarterly loss, no one will buy what you have to sell, shareholders who have lost just about everything don't want to play anymore, and Moody's handed the company a C (for crap) rating.

Bankruptcy looks like a realistic scenario. And just to keep things interesting, the SEC is investigating the company's 2007 financial results, the timing of margin calls, as well as accounting practices for the company's mortgage-backed securities.

Thornburg's problems have nothing to do with the sub-prime mortgage debacle, at least not directly. Thornburg specializes in jumbo mortgages to those with impeccable credit. Its default rate is the envy of the mortgage industry. So the problem is not creditworthiness, but liquidity. Investors simply are not interested in purchasing mortgage-backed securities of whatever quality in the secondary market.

Thornburg's latest last ditch effort calls for the company to purchase 90% of its preferred stock in exchange for $5 and 3.5 shares of common stock for each share of preferred stock. Shareholders recently gave the company permission to increase the number of shares outstanding from 500 million to four billion in order to make the tender offer possible. The deadline for tendering preferred shares has been extended to September 30. The stock is currently trading at $0.22 per share, way down from its 52 week high of $27.82.

Even a contrarian speculator will have to work very hard to find value in this one.

The U.S. Federal Reserve Wednesday announced new measures to add liquidity to the financial system, in a move coordinated with the European Central Bank, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank. The measure is designed to address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets, the Fed said.

The Federal Reserve also established a temporary Term Auction Facility (approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and a foreign exchange swap line with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank (approved by the Federal Open Market Committee).

Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window, the Fed said. All depository institutions that are judged to be in generally sound financial condition by their local Reserve Bank and that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit discount window program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions. All advances must be fully collateralized.

In August I posted on the danger that subprime mortgages pose to people who invest in money market funds. Today, the New York Times reports that several such funds have invested in commercial paper (CP) issued by Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) backed by subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). I think all money market funds should start a public information campaign to let people know if they have the SIV virus and if so, what they're doing to protect their customers from it.

Earlier, I posted on all the new vocabulary words I've learned in the last year thanks to the subprime mortgage meltdown. This $1.3 trillion market consists of mortgages to people who can't afford to repay in many cases. Forty seven percent of the loans were made without documentation of the borrower's income -- these are known as liar loans. The subprime mortgages were packaged as MBSs and among the buyers were SIVs -- off-balance sheet entities that use a bank's good credit rating to issue CP to invest in MBSs.

Thanks to the subprime mortgage meltdown, the CP is not worth as much as before so the money market funds that bought it are now forced to break the $1 per share constant value or put money into the fund to make up for the lost value. So far, analysts say that most SIV securities are trading at 97 to 98 cents on the dollar. But if more SIVs are forced to unwind, the resulting fire sale would put pressure on prices.

When financial world's mavens speak - - such as Alan Greenspan, George Soros, Bill Gross - - the markets usually take notice.

And when the mavens speak in unison regarding economic fundamentals, well, a word to the wise: be certain to record those data points before forming your own conclusion regarding the U.S. economy's health.

Soros, in a lecture at New York University, said the U.S. economy was on the verge of "a serious correction."
"I think we are definitely in for a slowdown that I think will be a bigger slowdown than (Federal Reserve Chairman Ben) Bernanke is seeing," Soros said, Reuters reported.

How vulnerable is your mutual fund to the ongoing mortgage meltdown? In this series, BloggingStocks contributor Lita Epstein, author of more than 20 books including Trading for Dummies and The Complete Idiot's Guide to Improving Your Credit Score, digs into mutual funds' holdings looking for securities with exposure to the currently shaky credit markets.

JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM), one of the major players in the SIV bailout, may not be a big player in the creation of SIVs, but its mutual funds do hold a lot of mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. While not all of these securities are in trouble, you should take a close look at any mutual fund that has a significant exposure to the types of securities tied to the current credit mess. In reviewing JPMorgan bond funds, I found a number of funds with significant exposure to these securities:

As of 9/30/2007, JPMorgan Ultra Short Duration Bond Fund holds 55.1% of its portfolio in collateralized mortgage obligations, 16.7% in mortgage pass-through securities, and 15.1% in asset-backed securities. That's a huge bet on the areas of the credit markets that appear the most at risk of default right now. The mortgage mess is not going away any time soon. If you do hold this fund, you need to ask yourself, do you want that level of exposure?

As of 9/30/2007, JPMorgan Core Bond Fund holds 46.6% of its assets in collateralized mortgage obligations and 10.3% in mortgage pass-through securities. That's more than half of its assets tied to the mortgage mess. Were you expecting this type of targeted investing when you chose this fund?