One of the world's premiere bond fund managers is recommending that investors view credit ratings issued by ratings agencies with a critical and skeptical eye.

Pimco's Bill Gross, in a commentary published on Pimco's website, said ratings agencies are necessary, but their services are overpriced and their evaluations are subject to the influence of the issuer, "which in turn muddles their minds and clouds their judgment to say the least."

Insurance company upgrades outpaced downgrades by 50% last year. In a report by insurance rating agency A.M. Best, Upgrades, Downgrades Moved at a Similar Pace in 2009, 36 commercial property/casualty insurers were upgraded, compared to 24 that saw their ratings head in the opposite direction.

According to the report, "By demonstrating consistently strong operating results over several years and maintaining sound underwriting discipline, conservative reserving practices and leading business positions in certain segments of the commercial market, these insurers have been able to strengthen their risk-adjusted capitalization."

Let's go back to financial crisis. Do you remember that it was the rating agencies that gave AAA ratings to a slew of investments that turned out to be worthless. This created a panic in world markets. Trading in derivatives came to a virtual standstill and the world was on the verge of collapse. Do you remember this?

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was asleep at the switch when all this happened and did nothing. Instead of doing the right thing and shutting all these rating agencies down, The SEC is forming a new group to investigate potential fraud cases.

Washington Post Business Columnist Steven Pearlstein does not 'hold it all in,' as they say, regarding who he thinks is most to blame for the financial crisis.

Pearlstein cites the ineptitude of Wall Street and the nation's financial regulators. The crisis would have occurred whether Lehman Brothers was saved or not, because bad debt had overwhelmed the global financial system. A government intervention was inevitable, essential, and an act of leadership, in Pearlstein's view.

Conversely, Wall Street's top executives have shown little leadership, if any, he said. Their silence and invisibility throughout the crisis "attests to their moral and political bankruptcy," Pearlstein said, a perfect match for the financial bankruptcy they caused for investors, creditors, and customers.

Further, Pearlstein is particularly angered by Wall Street's top executives unwillingness to commit to a plan to enable borrowers to refinance mortgages into government guaranteed mortgages set at 85% of current market value of the property, and at the executives' utter lack of comment before the cameras, particularly regarding credit lines to businesses.

Political & Economic Analysis: Columnist Pearlstein clearly lays the blame for the financial crisis at the feet of Wall Street's top officials. Still, the mortgage process -- and the failure of a substantial portion of the subprime/Alt-A mortgage market -- involved many players: bank executives/lenders, mortgage brokers, appraisers, securitization specialists, ratings agencies, and borrowers.

Any smart gambler, amateur or professional, knows that you only risk what you can afford to lose. That may be $1, $100, $500, or even a million dollars in a real estate or other major transaction. But only a fool bets the farm. Only a fool risks all.

What made so many bright minds all around the world foolishly bet the farm? One after another, that is what they did. Now we are all paying for it, some more than others. It was not just greed. It was something else.

How did this happen? I call it 'The Great Disconnect'.

When the managers of public companies do not suffer the same fate or consequences as their shareholders you have a disconnect! When politicians give lip service to understanding the pain of their constituencies but accept huge contributions from the enterprises they are supposed to regulate and oversee creating gargantuan conflicts of interest, you have a great disconnect.

When investment houses create financial instruments that are so complex that they cannot fathom the risk and the ratings agencies put candy coated frosting on them, you have a great disconnect!

I would propose that legislators not be allowed to accept any contribution creating a conflict of interest based on the committees they sit on. $700 billion reprise: Conservative bankers? Surely you jest!

I might even consider creating an independent committee of citizens selected from the willing, be placed in a position to review such matters.

The Wall Street Journal (subscription required) has obtained a draft version of the SEC's report on bond-rating firms and their role in the credit bubble, and some of the stuff is pretty scary.

In one e-mail, a staffer at Standard & Poor's, which is own by McGraw-Hill (NYSE: MHP) told another that "we rate every deal," and that "it could be structured by cows and we would rate it."

Another wrote that "rating agencies continue to create" an "even bigger monster -- the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters. ;O)"

Yes -- complete with the smiley face. If this seems reminiscent of disgraced analyst Henry Blodget's e-mails bashing stocks he was publicly pumping during the dot-com bubble, that's because it's exactly the same. The lesson here, once again, is this: e-mails ever really get deleted permanently and, if you're being shady or doing something unethical, make a phone call, talk with the person in a dark alley, or send them a letter that they can promptly discard. Don't send an e-mail!

Of course, S&P's investment-grade ratings on CDOs stuffed with dodgy loans turned out to be wildly optimistic, and the house of cards has done more than falter -- it's brought down Bear Stearns and wreaked havoc on the economy.

Analysts at some of the large credit ratings agencies may have had their eyes on the cash register instead of paying attention to the quality of their work. So says the SEC.

According to The Wall Street Journal, "The 10-month examination uncovered poor disclosure practices, a lack of policies and procedures guiding the analysis of mortgage-related debt, and insufficient attention paid to managing conflicts of interests."

That revelation all but buries the already damaged reputations of the ratings firms.

Making money is OK, but the practices may have lost investors billions of dollars. The big credit rating shops like Standard & Poor's have the job of evaluating the risk of products like mortgage-backed securities. Investment banks and their clients thought this paper was fairly safe. It did not turn out that way, not by a long shot.

If an enemy sworn to the destruction of the global economy was given free reign, it would follow the strategies of its current leaders.

One key to destroying an economy is to break its pricing mechanism. What does an effectively functioning pricing system do? It creates a market of buyers and sellers who can meet, agree on a price, conduct the transaction, and create an information trail that permits future market participants to judge what might be a fair price for their transactions.

Another key to destroying an economy is to put too low a price on risky behavior. Why is it important to price risk accurately? Because if decision-makers do not assess the risk at the time of their decision, the economy will end up paying for the under-priced risk long after those decision-makers have left office.

So how have current leaders broken the pricing mechanism and under-priced risk? Here are three ways:

Reuters reports that Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) controls 19.6% of Moody's Corp. (NYSE: MCO), is saying that he thinks Moody's will be around a long time. Even though Berkshire Hathaway's $188 billion market capitalization is more than 20 times that of Moody's -- Buffett's $1.8 billion loss -- the 50% drop in the value of his 19.6% Moody's stake from its February 9, 2007 peak -- has to sting.

Moody's was already under fire over the U.S. mortgage market crisis when it took a fresh blow on Wednesday -- launching an investigation into a report that it had wrongly assigned triple-A ratings to about $4 billion of complex European debt products -- Constant Proportion Debt Obligations (CPDOs), funds that used borrowed money to bet on credit-default swaps -- and had then not downgraded them. Buffett's comment: "I don't think one day will permanently change the franchise value of Moody's."

As I posted, the ratings agencies competed for lucrative fees from investment banks that created and sold these asset-backed securities. Moody's took in $3 billion for such structured finance ratings between 2002 through 2006. The agencies that offered the best ratings won the business.

Moody's (NYSE:MCO) made a mess of rating subprime debt and other risky instruments. It also said that some bonds help by municipal bond insurers was safe and that these companies should have "Aaa" ratings. Most of that turned out to be wrong and it helped cost investors, banks, and brokerage firms tens of millions of dollars.

Everyone from Moody's customers to Congress wants to know how the ratings could have been so wrong.

Now, the rating company has come up with a novel excuse for another series of mistakes. According to the FT , "Moody's awarded incorrect triple-A ratings to billions of dollars worth of a type of complex debt product due to a bug in its computer models." Several Moody's executives may have known about the mistake some time ago.

Comments from Moody's downplayed the problem. The company said that it adjusted its models from time to time.

The news may get the ratings agency into some real trouble, and it should. If the company was aware of the problem, why wasn't the information passed along to customers who rely on the ratings to make purchases?

Moody's ought to be dragged before regulators and be forced to give an entire accounting of the problem. Perhaps it should pay back customers who made bad decisions because of the errors. Of course, Moody's does not have that kind of cash.

Douglas A. McIntyre is an editor at 247wallst.com.

CNNMoney reports that McGraw-Hill Co.'s (NYSE: MHP) Standard & Poor's (S&P) forecasts the possibility of a $1 trillion bailout of Federal National Mortgage (NYSE: FNM) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage (NYSE: FRE) -- government sponsored purchasers of pools of loans which package them into securities. Specifically, S&P forecasts that a bailout of these two -- known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- would cost -- in a worst case scenario -- between $420 billion and $1.1 trillion of taxpayer's money. This would represent several times the $250 billion Savings & Loan bailout by the first President Bush.

It's a bit ironic for S&P to be issuing this report. After all, it was among the ratings agencies that contributed to the problem in the first place. As I posted last August, the ratings agencies competed for enormous fees from investment banks to put their AAA ratings on issues of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Those AAA ratings caused naive MBS buyers to skip the kind of detailed analysis of their purchases that might have stopped the flow of dumb money into the MBS bubble that is now putting Fannie and Freddie at risk.

How did S&P arrive at this scary conclusion? Both companies are forecast to report more losses this year due to declining home prices and rising mortgage defaults. And according to Yale professor, Robert Schiller, "The real fundamental problem is real estate prices have been falling and they might fall substantially more. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and Fannie and Freddie never considered the possibility of a massive real estate correction."

Given that the big credit rating agencies -- Moody's (NYSE: MCO) and McGraw-Hill's (NYSE: MHP) Standard & Poors -- completely failed in their assessment of risk when it came to mortgage-backed securities, it's no surprise that the SEC is being asked to take a look.

Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) has met with SEC Chairman Chris Cox to discuss conflicts of interest and disclosure problems. The Wall Street Journal quotes (subscription required) the senator as saying that "There has to be a lot more done about conflicts of interest at the agencies."

Among the worst of the rating agency abusers has been MBIA (NYSE: MBI) which, back in March, had the gall to ask Fitch to drop its coverage of the firm because they didn't like Fitch's opinion. To its credit, Fitch stayed strong and later downgraded the company's credit rating.

But wait, there's more: In a devastating piece on Friday, The Wall Street Journal reported (subscription required) on Moody's efforts to cozy up to issuers in exchange for more business, possibly at the expense of the integrity of their ratings.

This is essentially a replay of the issues involving conflicted analysts like Henry Blodget who, at the height of the internet stock bubble, sacrificed his research to the investment banking arm of his firm. It will take a tough regulator to clean up this mess, and I seriously doubt that Chris Cox is the man for job.

The good news is that MBIA (NYSE: MBI) saved its S&P "AAA" rating, meaning bonds it insures will not lose their value. A drop in the rating could have caused write-offs at banks that own paper covered by the bond insurer.

MBIA also announced yesterday that it will, sometime in the next five years, break its muni-bond insurance business from its structured finance operations, forming two companies. Structured finance bonds have lost much of their value because they include CDOs and mortgage securities.

The move may have helped save the company, but it comes with a huge cost. MBIA is eliminating its dividend to save $174 million a year. For investors taking advantage of the company's 10% yield, the news could hardly be worse.

MBIA may have bought itself some time, but it put the wood to shareholders to stay afloat.

Douglas A. McIntyre is an editor at 247wallst.com.

Standard & Poors, a division of McGraw-Hill (NYSE: MHP), has joined Moody's (NYSE: MCO) and Fitch in announcing reforms in the wake of the criticism for their role in the subprime fiasco.

S&P says it will hire an ombudsman to investigate conflicts of interest and bring in an outside firm to look at compliance and ethics-related issues. Lead analysts will be rotated from time to time and the company will consider a slew of new factors: liquidity, volatility, correlation and recovery, and "worst-case scenarios."

But New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo isn't buying it: "The supposed reforms announced today by Standard & Poor's and by Moody's on Tuesday are too little, too late. Both S.&P. and Moody's are attempting to make piecemeal change that seem more like public relations window-dressing than systemic reform."

From an investor's standpoint, I'm inclined to agree with Mr. Cuomo. Moody's carries a market cap of nearly $10 billion, but its entire business depends on the willingness of investors to take its ratings and analysis seriously.

But over the past year or so, the "work" of the ratings agencies has been exposed as pretty much a joke. It will take a lot more than this to recover the company's reputation.

Moody's (NYSE: MCO) is thinking of releasing a new ratings system that does not use letters, but has numeric ratings and "warning labels" for securities that may be difficult to analyze.

According to The Wall Street Journal, "one of the most significant changes being considered by the parent of Moody's Investors Service: a new, 21-point numerical scale to rate structured securities." The new system would also help investors look at CDOs and other risky investments differently from corporate bonds.

The whole exercise is bogus. Moody's could have employed a similar system long ago. Why are numbered ratings any different from those that use letters? Why didn't the firm have a systems that indicated the risks in complex securities such as CDOs and other structured investments?

The Moody's move is simply an attempt to try to hide and rectify the substantial flaws in the system that exists now. And, it is a feeble attempt to boot.

Douglas A. McIntyre is an editor at 247wallst.com.