Merna Re, the largest catastrophe bond of all time, is set to mature in June, and State Farm is already putting together its replacement, the creatively named Merna Re II. The successor, planned for issuance in April, is said to be for $400 million in risk capital, though investor demand could push it as high as $700 million. This still pales in comparison to the $1.2 billion that the original brought in the door.

If State Farm is able to stimulate demand for Merna Re II, which would protect the company from non-California earthquake risk in the U.S., it will be third cat bond to come to market in 2010, which is expected to be a strong year for this form of risk transfer. The cat bond market fell silent after the near-collapse of American International Group (AIG) in September 2008 but was still the third busiest in terms of capital issued in the history of the cat bond market. Heading into 2009, prospects for the cat bond space seemed uncertain, but a robust fourth quarter eventually resulted in a year-over-year increase, driven mostly by repeat issuers.

Catastrophe modelers, insurers and reinsurers are still sorting out the damage from Windstorm Xynthia in Europe and the earthquake in Chile. Taking only the highest of high-end estimates, the damage from these two catastrophes could exceed $12 billion, resulting in fairly steep property-catastrophe losses long before hurricane season begins. With three more major property reinsurance renewals remaining for the year -- at April 1, June 1 (Florida) and July 1 -- there is plenty of time for the impact of these events to be absorbed into reinsurance pricing.

Interest rates are the top concern among global financial services firms in the pension risk management business.

According to a new survey by Aon's (AON) human capital arm, 58% of the big players in the pension risk management space cite this factor as the biggest issue facing defined benefit pension plan sponsors from the present to 2013. Longevity risk is next, with 21% of the responses, followed by equity markets at 15% and inflation at 6%.

Despite the magnitude of the recent earthquake in Chile – in both physical and financial terms – it's unlikely to trigger a catastrophe bond payout. Catastrophe modeling firms AIR Worldwide and EQECAT offer a range of estimated insured losses of $2 billion to $8 billion, though the dust is still settling. According to insurance securitization blog Artemis.bm, "A similar quake in the right area of the U.S. or Japan would most certainly have triggered a cat bond."

Though there has been cat bond activity in Latin America, none have been issued in the region to cover earthquake risk. Low rates of insurance penetration are likely to keep what will already be a costly situation for insurers and reinsurers from being even worse -- i.e., because not much coverage has been written in Chile.

The end of a year means a rush of data from the insurance and reinsurance industries, as treaties are renewed for the coming year. Catastrophe bonds are a part of this annual orgy of data production, as a flurry of activity occurs in December, with the industry's commitment to this form of alternative property-catastrophe risk-transfer setting the tone for the year to come. The cat bond market isn't big enough to push reinsurance rates, but you can generally get a sense of what the coming year will look like for cat bonds based on pricing for traditional reinsurance.

Talk of "green shoots" abounds with the S&P 500 up 40% from its lows in March 2009, but Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) CEO Lloyd Blankfein remains cautious in his outlook for the global economy. "I think it's going to be a long, protracted recession," he said while speaking on a panel at the annual International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) conference in Tel Aviv.

Blankfein also emphasized the importance of intelligent regulation and risk management, warning fellow finance executives not to discount the latter. "The culture of risk management is very important and hard to legislate, but at the end of the day, you have to make sure that the people on the risk management side of your operation are just as capable, and maybe therefore, just as well-paid and have the career opportunities as people on the producing side of the business."

This post is part of a feature on companies and products that our bloggers think are in need of a makeover. See all 26.

In light of the short-selling ban, someone recently asked me for my opinion about short selling. Personally, I'm grudgingly accepting of the practice, but I believe that some serious changes need to be made. I believe that the practice of short selling should be made harder to engage in, more expensive to execute, limited in duration, and heavily scrutinized.

The uptick rule is fine, and it never should have been suspended, but I feel that it falls short of the mark. Bear raids can still be orchestrated in spite of uptick only buys. Purchasing on the uptick simply slows the process a little. A system must be developed by which the practice of bear raids is effectively terminated.

When I researched opinions and viewpoints on short selling, it became quite apparent that the writers I had encountered were not supporting short selling nearly as much as they were simply railing against a short-selling ban. Not one person actually made a case for why the practice is essential to market health. The closest I came to finding an eloquent argument in favor of short selling was an article by Paul R. LaMonica, editor at large, CNNMoney.com. Though Mr. LaMonica didn't really explain to me why I should be shorting stocks to benefit the markets, he did quote the SEC on 3.5 reasons why shorting might be beneficial.

This post is part of a series on some of the most memorable companies that have disappeared.

I credit Nick Leeson for creating jobs for lots of my friends. Back in 1995, when he single-handedly brought down Barings Bank with currency trading run amok, I had never heard the term "risk management." But I soon started hearing right and left of friends getting highly paid jobs at financial firms in the "risk management" department.

Apparently, after Mr. Leeson lost $1.4 billion dollars in unauthorized trading rendering Barings insolvent, financial institutions around the world decided to put in more rigorous systems of checks and balances that would keep such things from happening. Hence, newly expanded risk management departments.

Founded in 1762, Barings Bank was the oldest merchant bank in London, financed the Napoleonic Wars, and was the Queen of England's own bank.

This post is part of a series on some of the most memorable companies that have disappeared.

Going, going, gone!

No more Bear Stearns. What a shame. It did not have to be, but alas -- bad management, greed, and too much negativity on Wall Street made it unsustainable when sustainability is the word of the day. It is, or should I say was, one of the foremost investment banks on Wall Street for many decades.

JPMorgan Chase (NYSE: JPM) completed it acquisition of Bear Stearns (NYSE: BSC) on May 30, 2008. As a result, Fitch Ratings has upgraded the ratings of BSC and removed them from Rating Watch Positive, where they were originally placed on March 17. As the direct and sole owner of BSC, JPM has assumed the capital structure of BSC.

Bear Stearns had been one of the top investment banking, clearing, and brokerage firms in the United States, serving major corporations, institutions, governments, and high net worth individuals. Through several subsidiaries, it provided asset management, lending, and merger and acquisition advisory services. It's been a leading market-maker for NYSE-listed securities (through Bear Wagner Specialists), as well as for OTC shares, corporate and government bonds, and derivative products.

It was these derivative loan instruments that did them in. Bear Stearns, a company that for decades was relied upon to help its customers assess risk, fell short when it came to managing its own. Management was not watching very closely, and if they were, they did not understand what they were seeing. (See Serious Money: The page on Buffett Part V: Company Management.)

In this month's Portfolio magazine, Michael Lewis wonders if the Black-Scholes formula -- the formula used to calculate and manage risk throughout the financial world, including determining the risk of trade positions and hedging strategies -- is flawed.

The Black-Scholes formula is an advanced mathematical formula generally credited with revolutionizing options pricing. Its assumptions are the basis for short trades and options designed to protect a trader against losses, no matter how much the market falls.

However, as Lewis outlines, while the formula has been good, it is not perfect, as evidenced by the October 1987 stock market crash, when traders and institutions learned that even with Black-Scholes techniques deployed, when the market is crashing and no one is willing to buy, it's impossible to sell short. The outcome? On "Black Monday," the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged 508 points or 22.6% on October 19, 1987.

One of the characteristics of this decade's bull market has been the emergence, use, and growth of derivatives, options and futures products, both for hedging and for pure investing purposes, and a company in this segment worth a review is FC Stone.

FCStone Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: FCSX) provides risk management consulting and transaction execution services to commercial commodity intermediaries, end-users and producers. An FCSX unit also offers grain merchandising services for grain buyers/sellers in the U.S. and overseas; the company also ships about 100 million bushels of grain per year.