The loans that got us into this mess were generally the first to fall. Variable rate mortgages written without documentation for people with sketchy credit histories shocked nobody as their slide became an avalanche. But, the good stuff is starting to follow. An increasing amount of fixed rate mortgages offered to borrowers with solid credit histories are feeling their ways to foreclosure. Blame unemployment for this one. When people can't work, it gets pretty hard to pay the mortgage.

Fixed rate, high quality mortgages had a foreclosure a year ago. Last quarter, it jumped to 33%, according to a Mortgage Bankers Association report. As this happened, the amount of homeowners behind on their payments or in foreclosure just set another record high ... for the ninth month in a row. Subprime mortgages are headed in the other direction. Low quality adjustable rate mortgages are now 16% of new foreclosures -- compared to 35% last year. And, more than 18% of Federal Housing Administration loans are anywhere from one payment behind to in foreclosure, with California, Nevada, Arizona and Florida worst off: together, they accounted for 44% of new foreclosures.

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Deutsche Bank (NYSE: DB) expects almost half of all U.S. homeowners to be underwater -- figuratively, of course -- by 2011.

Declines in home prices and the fact that some of those difficult mortgages just aren't going away put 26% of homeowners in this situation by the end of last March, and it seems the situation is only going to get worse. Unlike the early stages of the credit crisis, which were driven by subprime mortgages, the next iteration will have a greater effect on prime mortgage borrowers, which comprise two-thirds of the loans outstanding.

KeyCorp (NYSE: KEY) stepped into the earnings spotlight this morning, announcing that its second-quarter loss checked in at 69 cents per share (68 cents per share excluding charges). A year ago, the bank lost $2.71 per share in the second quarter. Although the results were better than those from a year ago, they were not better than the consensus estimate, which called for a loss of 41 cents per share.

The company also announced that it was cutting the amount of preferred shares that it plans to exchange by 71%. KeyCorp's CEO (Henry Meyer III) stated that the company's results "reflect the weak economic environment and the steps that it has taken to address issues in credit quality, strengthen capital and control costs." Like many regional banks, KeyCorp suffered thanks to the credit crunch; even though the bank was not a major player in the subprime-mortgage fiasco. The company added that loan-loss provisions were $850 million, which was 31% greater than a year ago.

Subprime mortgage defaults peaked and will slowly begin to slide during the next two years.

But don't get excited -- option ARMs and ALT-A mortgages are now beginning to rise at a very rapid rate. According to analysts I follow, notably Ivy Zelman, the next tsunami will be larger than the one we just went through.

And the banks are not currently valuing these mortgages as if they will default at this rate.

Be sure to read all 7 reasons the stock market isn't going up any time soon.

Michael Shulman is a contributor to OptionsZone.com.

This post is part of our feature on Money Winners of 2008. See all 20.

Lots of people thought real estate was overpriced. Many worried that banks were giving out mortgages too cheap. But what did you do about it? (Either to help the situation or to make money.) Jeff Greene, a real estate mogul in California, actually found a way to bet against the subprime mortgage folly. He made $450 million -- at least that was the count earlier this year.

Well, he didn't just think of it on his own. He basically took the idea that his friend, hedge fund manager John Paulson, had. Paulson thought that, as an individual, Greene wouldn't be able to do this complex a transaction. According to the Wall Street Journal he even used special software so investors in a hedge fund Paulson created just to exploit the subprime crisis couldn't pass on his strategy.

How Greene and Paulson made money involves two financial terms you've probably had to learn this year and never want to hear again. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are the way mortgages are packaged and sold to investors in various slices of risk. Credit default swaps are the holders of those investments insured themselves -- by buying what was like unregulated insurance from one another. The credit default swaps are what got so many big companies in trouble -- they had to pay up on investments that went bad. So Paulson shorted CDOs and bought some credit default swaps.

There is not much not to like about my friend's house. It has a four-car garage and sits on a beautifully manicured lawn. The 3-acre property has a lake out back where geese hang out during the summer. The other day, I noticed the house next door was for sale. My friend casually informed me that the home was abandoned some months ago.

Looks like the subprime crisis has migrated to the ritzy suburbs. Several homes in this neighborhood have been abandoned, which has forced the neighborhood association to check on the properties to make sure everything is okay. Keep in mind that these homes probably fetched at least $600,000 before the market crashed. Of course, that's all changed now.

Builders flooded the market with spec homes, which is one of the reasons why the market has so much excess inventory. People were eager for their slice of the American Dream, whether they could afford it or not. Bankers were willing to feed these delusions with cockamamie loans that would re-set interest rates at the drop of a hat. There is plenty of blame to go around.

Congressional investigators repeatedly, verbally pummeled former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan Thursday, for what lawmakers charged was a lack of oversight for a mortgage and housing market run amok - - a lapse they believe encouraged a subprime financing boom and collapse that led to the global financial crisis.

Greenspan, looking subdued but characteristically composed as he testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, conceded that a flaw in his free-market ideology contributed to a "once-in-a-century credit tsunami," Bloomberg News reported Thursday.

Greenspan: mortgage risk was miss-priced

The flaw, Greenspan said, was the failure by banks and mortgage lenders to properly price risky mortgage assets, including subprime / Alt-A mortgages, The Washington Post reported Thursday. Further, Greenspan said he saw "no choice" but to force the financial firms that package mortgage loans to "retain a meaningful part of the securities they issue" - - thus mandating that if the loans go bad, they will lose money, as well.

Further, Greenspan said he was "partially" wrong in his opposition in recent years to the regulation of derivatives, Bloomberg News reported Thursday - - in stark contrast to his May 2005 speech opposing derivatives regulation.

Economist David H. Wang told BloggingStocks Thursday that the failure to regulate and review lending practices by banks and mortgage lenders was a bipartisan failure.

"Both political parties are responsible because neither Democrats nor Republicans, not just Republicans, cared about the quality of mortgages banks approved during the housing boom," Wang said. "It was like grade inflation in college where the professor gives 'C' grades to students whose work only deserves a 'D.' No one cared about the quality of the loans as long as they were sold and no longer on their balance sheet. In the future, loan originators must retain partial equity in the loan to make them accountable for mortgage defaults."

The head of the Senate Banking Committee has indicated that the U.S. Federal Reserve has the authority to create a new 'debt fund' to buy, warehouse and dispose of distressed / bad debt resulting from the subprime mortgage crisis.

"The Fed has the authority to move in this area," U.S. Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Connecticut and chairman of the committee, told Bloomberg News.

Many economists and analysts argue that a step integral to stemming the cycle of foreclosure / housing price decline / bad bonds / stock run / collateral call / bankruptcy is for a special agency to buy up and strategically restructure, then sell, distressed / bad assets. Economist Peter Dawson is one of those economists who favors the tool.

"Ideally, you'd like to have a private-sector consortium of banks or other financial institutions to coordinate the effort, but right now there aren't exactly a lot of banks stepping up to the plate to take a swing," Dawson told BloggingStocks Thursday. "There's a considerable amount of fear in the market, frankly, and banks are hoarding cash. If this remains the case then we'll need a public sector effort to put this new institution in place."

Homeowners struggling to pay their bills must find the federal government's bailout of troubled Wall Street firms confusing.

After all, government officials have repeatedly said they would not help victims of the subprime mortgage crisis, reasoning that they should not get rewarded for making bad decisions.

It's Economics 101 that people who take bad risks will continue to do so if there are no consequences to their actions. But the $85 billion rescue of American International Group Inc. (NYSE: AIG), the bailout of Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM) and Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE), the possible rescue of Washington Mutual Inc. (NYSE: WM) and the shotgun wedding of Merrill Lynch & Co. (NYSE: MER) to Bank of America (NYSE: BAC) brings all of these cherished notions of free markets into question.

Why is the government helping companies who sold mortgages to people who they knew couldn't afford them and repackaged the loans into securities that were unloaded on unsuspecting investors -- but doing little for individual homeowners?

It's been over a year since I last posted on liar loans -- these are mortgages which the borrower obtains despite offering no documentation on their income, employment or assets. These liar loans were also known as Ninja loans -- which is short for no income, no job, and no assets. The Associated Press reports that such liar loans will add $100 billion to the losses our economy is already suffering thanks to $400 billion worth of losses from subprime mortgages.

The problem we face as an economy is that it's hard to see where the liar loans end and the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other asset-backed securities begin. In a sense, they are all liar loans. In the case of the mortgages, borrowers created paperwork that was inconsistent with their actual financial condition so they could get the money. In the case of CDOs, the issuing investment bank bought a AAA rating from a rating agency which created the illusion that the security was safe. Conceptually, there is little difference -- both depended on essentially forged paperwork to make the loan go through.

Why did banks issue liar loans? They were afraid to lose market share. But that doesn't make it right. As my mother used to say to me, if the other kids jumped off the Empire State Building, would you do it too? AP brings this to life in an interview with David Zugheri, co-founder of Texas-based lender First Houston Mortgage who said, "Everybody drank the Kool-Aid. They knew if they didn't give the borrower the loan they wanted, the borrower could go down the street and get that loan somewhere else.''

Bloomberg News reports that banks' subprime write-downs have hit $500 billion. The last time I checked, that figure was $400 billion. Bloomberg reports that New York University economist Nouriel Roubini forecasts such losses will ultimately total $2 trillion. I wonder if he would revise his estimate upwards.

Recently banks have been taking write-downs for their Auction Rate Securities (ARS). Bloomberg reports about $1.9 billion has been set aside so far to cover ARS losses. It notes that UBS AG (NYSE: UBS) set aside $900 million to cover potential losses and Citigroup, Inc. (NYSE: C) and Wachovia (NYSE: WB) each estimate that their ARS buybacks will cost $500 million.

Write-downs have been going hand in hand with capital raising. But banks and brokers have not been able to raise enough capital to offset the losses. Bloomberg calculates that they've raised "$353 billion of capital to cope with the write-downs. The gap between the losses and capital infusions, which stands at $148 billion, has regularly narrowed to about $80 billion as capital raising follows write-down announcements."

Can banks and brokerages raise another $1.7 trillion to keep up with the write-downs that Roubini forecasts? I sincerely doubt it.

Peter Cohan is President of Peter S. Cohan & Associates. He also teaches management at Babson College and edits The Cohan Letter. He owns Citigroup stock and has no financial interest in the other securities mentioned.

BNP Paribas, which helped signal the global credit crisis that started one year ago this week, has emerged from the credit crunch as France's healthiest bank, Bloomberg News reported Monday.

BNP Paribas will announce Q2 financial results this week. While earnings are expected to be lower year-over-year, they will probably be better than those of its rivals, Societe Generale SA and Credit Agricole SA, according to Bloomberg. BNP Paribas fell 1.76 euros to 59.77 euros in Monday afternoon trading in Paris.

About a year ago, on August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from three funds that invested in subprime mortgage debt. The bank's announcement proved to be the first of dozens credit-loss and write-down announcements by banks, mortgage lenders and other institutional investors, as subprime assets went bad, due to defaults by subprime mortgage payers.

The losses and resulting credit crunch compelled the intervention by the world's major central banks. The U.S. Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Swiss National Bank and Bank of Canada made hundreds of billions of dollars available in specialized loans through conventional monetary policy tools and via new, special 'facilities,' in an effort to maintain credit market liquidity and prevent bad bank/mortgage lender business models from undermining healthy sectors and the broader economies in the United States and the European Union.

Economic growth is the major concern today

London-based economist Mark Chandler told BloggingStocks Monday that concern about credit markets freezing up again has diminished, but concern about the impact of the housing sector's slowdown on broader economies has not.

Joining the likes of other larger financial institutions and banks, mortgage giant Washington Mutual Inc. (NYSE: WM) joined the billion-dollar loss club. The company's quarterly results reflected a $3.33 billion loss, bringing its total loss reserve to $8 billion due to bad loans in its portfolio.

Similar to what kindergarteners face, the mortgage industry's "monkey see, monkey do" attitude just keeps the billion-dollar losses coming quarter after quarter. WaMu did say that it would be trimming up to $1 billion in costs by the end of next year. Ah, how nice! If you're a WaMu shareholder, does that statement give you any comfort? Probably not.

To go from an $830 million profit in 2007 to a $3.3 billion loss in 2008 is unspeakable, but it's almost the norm these days with mortgage-involved entities floating at the top of the fishbowl. Even though WaMu reflected a capital raise in April in its loss, the company still lost $3.34 per share even at that. Writeoffs totaled $2.17 billion and the company changed the time period from three years down to a year in which to evaluate defaults in its prime mortgage portfolio. As of this morning, WM shares are down over 20% from before Tuesday's report, and down over 57% for this year as well.

The Washington Times reports that Phil Gramm, UBS AG (NYSE: UBS) vice chairman and senior economic advisor to John McCain (R.-AZ), thinks we're a nation of whiners. Gramm's UBS is a leader on three important fronts in the effort to destroy the U.S. economy: the $1.3 trillion subprime mortgage catastrophe, the $330 billion Auction Rate Securities (ARS) freeze, and a tax evasion scheme of unknown magnitude.

The Washington Times quotes Gramm as saying: "We have sort of become a nation of whiners. You just hear this constant whining." UBS probably pays Gramm well for his services so I can see where he's coming from. He is making money and he's the only one who matters. But if you think he is helping McCain, think about these things:

H&R Block (NYSE: HRB), whose colleagues include Intuit (NASDAQ: INTU) and Jackson Hewitt (NYSE: JTX), reported Q4 and full-year earnings on Monday. The numbers looked pretty good to me. For Q4, revenues increased 11% to $2.6 billion and earnings per diluted share from continuing operations increased 17% to $2.11. According to this article, analysts' expectations were beat by $0.08. For the full year, the top line expanded by 10%, coming in at $4.4 billion. Earnings per diluted share from continuing operations jumped 21% to $1.39.

The tax specialist said it worked with 23.5 million clients, the most ever in its corporate history. That's a nice indication of health for the company, I suppose, but here's a better one. The board decided to juice the dividend. The annual payment will now be $0.60 per share, translating to a 5% increase. Okay, 5% isn't too exciting, I'll grant you, but H&R Block has now increased its payments to shareholders every year for over a decade.

But, as the company stated in its release, although it intends on repurchasing shares over the next few years, it will remain "particularly disciplined" about the subject in the next fiscal year. Essentially, that means shareholders should not expect a lot of share repurchases for a while. H&R Block is reacting to the fact that it is still rebooting itself after being victimized by the subprime mortgage crisis. I'd rather hear a more aggressive stance in terms of buyback plans, but I'd say there is prudent motive in such posture given the company's state.