How do you know the green finance sector has arrived? Well, it got its first Ponzi scheme! Allegedly.

The SEC filed charges against four people and two companies in a Denver federal court on Monday. Mantria Corp. and its principals, Troy Wragg and Amanada Knorr, stand accused of running raising $122 million from more than 300 investors in what could be a dozen fraudulent offers of securities. Mantria engaged Speed of Wealth LLC, run by Wayde and Donna McKelvy, to dump the cash out of their retirement plans and tap their home equity to "invest" in Mantria, which they said was offering returns ranging from 17% to "hundreds of percent" every year.

Normal tech support phone call: "Press 1 for help with e-mail. Press 2 to have your password reset."

Madoff tech support phone call: "Hello, how can I help you dummy up some trading records today?"

The investigation of Bernie Madoff's fraudulent financial empire is leading to more arrests. Jerome O'Hara and George Perez, both computer programmers employed by the Ponzi schemer, were arrested by the FBI on Friday morning. The charges include conspiracy for falsifying books and records. They are accused of doing the deed for the boss and accepting hush money -- in the form of 25% raises and net bonuses of $60,000 -- to keep the scam afloat.

Another player in the Bernie Madoff saga has fallen. His longtime auditor, David Friehling, pleaded guilty in federal court on Tuesday to charges of securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, making false filings with the SEC, and obstructing or impeding the administration of the Internal Revenue laws (among others).

Despite the plea, Friehling still told U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, "At no time was I ever aware Bernard Madoff was engaged in a Ponzi scheme."

Investors are calling for an inquiry into mutual fund fees, but the Supreme Court is reminding them that it isn't beholden to public opinion. The mutual fund industry is being accused of charging "excessive" fees, which could be particularly harsh on individual investors who use these tools as their primary way to access the market. Currently, the mutual fund industry has more than $10 trillion in assets under management, some of it through retirement and 529 college savings plans.

The Court doesn't seem inclined to step into the fray, saying that regulatory agencies are better equipped to address the situation. Chief Justice John Roberts, for example, said during arguments that "It makes a lot more sense to have the SEC regulate rates than to have courts do it, doesn't it?"

Sir Allen Stanford's attorney doesn't like Ralph Janvey, but that's not surprising. The SEC isn't crazy about him either, and U.S. Judge David Godbey told him, "You know everyone in the courtroom is angry with you," according to a report in USA Today.

Janvey has been tasked with taking over and cleaning up the wreckage from Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme -- the second largest known disaster of this kind. Along the way, he's managed to piss off everyone he's encountered. The latest "transgression" is his demand for more than $27 million in fees for his team and the consultants he's hired to track down the missing billions of dollars in Stanford's former empire.

So, here's one for you -- according to Joseph Cotchett (a lawyer for some of Bernie Madoff's victims), Bernie Madoff is surprised that his Ponzi scheme lasted as long as it did. The revelation came during a 4.5 hour interview, wherein Madoff revealed how the scheme worked and how securities regulators didn't catch him. Madoff did apologize, repeatedly, for the harm he caused victims.

The most interesting part of the interview is when Madoff described meetings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) while he was committing the fraud and how the SEC was unable to catch him, which didn't surprise him. These comments lead Cotchett to theorize that "many people" were negligent, including the government watchdog agencies. Let's not forget that the SEC has seen no evidence of wrongdoing by its staff as far as the Madoff situation is concerned. Nevertheless, the SEC has undergone many changes in order to continue to protect investors and the market.

David Friehling is only the second person to face criminal charges in the Bernard Madoff debacle. He served as Madoff's auditor from 1991 to 2008, though it's hard to say if they'll resume their relationship as cellies. For now, Friehling has only been charged (innocent until proven guilty, and such) with securities fraud, abetting investment adviser fraud and filing false reports with the SEC. On five of the six charges filed, he faces a 20-year maximum.

It's alleged that Friehling didn't conduct "meaningful" audits while in Madoff's employ, despite issuing reports saying that he'd done his job -- which paid close to $15,000 a month (no work for big pay . . . where do I sign up?). In particular, he's said to have not bothered to verify Madoff's business assets, revenue sources or bank accounts. This is no-brainer stuff for an auditor.

State Street Corp. (NYSE: STT) said today that its State Street Bank & Trust Co. unit received a Wells Notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The notice, which indicates that civil charges may be brought against the company, relates to disclosures and management of certain fixed-income strategies during 2007 and previous periods.

Some investors have accused State Street of misleading them about the risks involved in mortgage-related investments. A legal reserve fund worth $625 million was established in 2007 to cover investor claims, and $418 million has already been paid out. The firm says it is currently cooperating with the SEC, as well as state and other regulators.

Hedge fund manager Michael Regan has pleaded guilty to running a Ponzi scheme. Manager of the Massachusetts-based River Stream Fund, he admitted to defrauding around 70 investors. The fund held just shy of $20 million in assets ... despite the relatively meager $101,600 sitting in its accounts. The fund purported to return 20 percent a year since 2001, paying out $9 million in "profits" and returned capital.

Matrixx Initiatives (NASDAQ: MTXX), maker of the allegedly scent-stealing Zicam nasal swabs, tumbled to a new annual low this morning on news that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is launching an informal inquiry. The SEC is requesting documents and other information regarding the warning letter issued to Matrixx by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Last week, the FDA told consumers to stop using certain nasally administered Zicam products after the agency received more than 130 complaints from users who lost their sense of smell. Matrixx has defended its homeopathic, over-the-counter offerings, calling the safety concerns "erroneous," but the firm settled hundreds of lawsuits in 2006 with consumers making the same allegations.

Pequot Capital Management is coming to an end, closing the book on two decades of hedge fund history. Arthur Samberg, at one point the biggest hedge fund manager in the world, is closing the company as a result of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) insider trading investigation.

At its peak in 2001, Pequot had $15 million in assets under management. By November 2008, it was only $4.3 billion ... and $3.47 billion as of May 15, 2009, according to a regulatory filing.

A lot was said this past week in regard to the SEC attack on rumor mongering and willful misrepresentation of facts for the benefit of naked short sellers. One point that I'd like to make perfectly clear is this: The SEC's indicated desire to quash the spreading of false negative information by, and for the benefit of, manipulative short sellers, is nothing even remotely akin to a First Amendment issue. The First Amendment does not give protection to slanderers, liars, and sabotage artists. I'd also like to make clear my opinion that honest short selling is a positive, healthy, and necessary practice. I believe it helps to define and benchmark real value within the markets.

The Los Angels Times reported that SEC Chairman Christopher Cox may have his hands full in the wake of a measure that protects nearly two dozen large financial firms from naked short selling. The measure requires "anyone effecting a short sale in these securities (to) arrange beforehand to borrow the securities and deliver them at settlement." It's a rule that is long over due for enforcement and that shall most probably, at least temporarily, lay to rest some serious market abuses.

If you have an ADR for Japanese electronics giant NEC, save it as a collectible. In light of the SEC's recent decision to revoke NEC's securities registration in the U.S., there will not be any more of those ADRs. NEC ran afoul of U.S. listing requirements when it failed to file annual reports for 2006 and 2007, and improperly booked revenues for 2000-2006. NEC was also the victim of internal fraud when at least 10 emplyees, over a period of several years, booked millions of dollars worth of fraudulent transactions. NEC had no procedures in place to authenticate or track these transactions.

To be fair to NEC, recognizing software sales revenue up front in complicated under GAAP SOP 97-2, particularly when the software is sold as part of a service package that also includes hardware and/or software maintenance. But NEC was responsible for taking steps to see it was not being robbed blind from within. NEC was delisted from active trading on Nasdaq in November 2007. NEC neither accepted nor disputed the SEC decision. The company has also been under investigation by the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau. NEC states it has constructed sufficient internal controls to cut back on the potential for internal fraud. Too little, too late. The stock now trades on the pink sheets.

The perceptive and common sense-rooted Ben Stein, in a business column in The New York Times, has weighed-in on the credit crisis, and for market absolutists, it's an argument they probably don't want to hear.

Stein, like many of us, has pondered how the massively well-paid men and women of Wall Street could create such a catastrophe. How did some of the smartest, talented executives, Stein ruminates, generate such immense losses that "they made banks clam up on lending -- at great risk to the economy?"

Compelling questions

Stein asks: Where were the fail-safe devices? The government watchdogs? The ratings agencies? A speech by Greenlight Capital hedge fund manager David Einhorn at a Grant's Interest Rate Observer event, provided the answers -- the unfortunate truths of the recent housing/credit boom -- which Stein summarized:

You can add another item to the list of things the market has to be worried about.

In this month's Portfolio magazine, Michael Lewis wonders if the Black-Scholes formula -- the formula used to calculate and manage risk throughout the financial world, including determining the risk of trade positions and hedging strategies -- is flawed.

The Black-Scholes formula is an advanced mathematical formula generally credited with revolutionizing options pricing. Its assumptions are the basis for short trades and options designed to protect a trader against losses, no matter how much the market falls.

However, as Lewis outlines, while the formula has been good, it is not perfect, as evidenced by the October 1987 stock market crash, when traders and institutions learned that even with Black-Scholes techniques deployed, when the market is crashing and no one is willing to buy, it's impossible to sell short. The outcome? On "Black Monday," the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged 508 points or 22.6% on October 19, 1987.